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1. Introduction 
The international economy witnessed the so-called 
liquidity trap in the 1930s, which was essentially a 
deflationary process triggered by the collapse of the 
unprecedented economic boom in the USA followed by 
defunct financial policy. For the last several years, the US 
economy, which now appears to be getting back within the 
law of gravity, has enjoyed a soaring boom that has had 
benevolent effects on many countries. Meanwhile, the 
present international economy has witnessed a 
“restructuring trap” in East Asia, especially in Japan (debt 
trap, as we call it) , and a “transition trap” in Central Asia. 
As of yet, there has been no magic solution to either the 
restructuring trap or the transition trap. 
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The restructuring trap is an economic situation in which 
no sign of significant economic rebound has emerged 
despite both public money injection into the ailing financial 
sector (financial re-capitalization) and expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies. The economic inertia, which 
has been crawling on the bottom line for years, appears to 
have arisen both from the “morning after (hangover)” 
effect of the rapid economic growth and from a series of 
structural setbacks such as excessive debt and investment.  
The inertia has also been negatively affected by increasing 
employment uncertainty, combined with consumption 
weakness, and substantial deterioration of asset quality, 
accelerated by economic shrinkage accompanied by 
gloomy financial indicators. The inertia has been prolonged 
by ineffective response in the real sector under the pressure 
of industrial and corporate restructuring and technological 
innovations, resulting in economic inertia in many regions. 
It is becoming clearer that the traditional use of macro-
economic policy to boost the economy simply may not 
work. 
The transition trap is an economic situation in which 
institutional and policy reform in countries in transition to 
the market mechanism has not been fruitful, with many of 
them remaining below the 1990 level. This trap is 
attributable to many factors in each country but there seem 
to be some common threads lying underneath:  
First, the impact of the collapse of the already existing 
economic network was more serious than what had been 
anticipated by international institutions and many reformers 
and economists.  
Second, neither marketization nor privatization of the 
command (centrally planned) economy has been decisive 
enough; stopping government intervention is comparable to 
stopping smoking, that is, there is not much decisiveness 
and commitments are repeated. Or an alternative approach 
of “gradualism” has failed to present a clear picture of 
policy package or policy sequence. Many economies in 
transition remain somewhere between planned and market 
economies.  
The third common thread is that state-owned enterprises 
have been only poorly privatized and have generally failed 
to activate their businesses, while the current economic 
environments are not good enough to pave the way from 
small business successes to bigger ones.  
Fourth, advocate arguments and efforts for economic 
reform are often from outside rather than from inside the 
transitional economies and the prolonged economic 
disruption has made the informal economy unavoidably 
prevalent in many countries. 
A fifth similarity is that foreign direct investment has been 
hampered by a variety of factors, other than in limited areas 
such as energy/mineral resources.  
Sixth, financial dis-intermediation seems to have failed to 
smoothen economic and business friction. Closely related 
to this is the fact that these countries have failed to secure 
people’s confidence in their national currencies. 
And seventh, technological innovations centering on 
information and telecommunications during the 1990s have 
posed a digital divide to many economies in transition, 
especially in Central Asian and Caucasian countries. 
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Focusing on the sixth topic, this paper is intended to (1) 
analyze the financial infrastructure of Central Asian 
countries, (2) assess the nature of financial information in 
these countries, and (3) discuss performance of various 
financial services. 
 
2. Organizational Approach to Financial 
Systems 
  Three aspects form the basis for analyzing a financial 
system in one country (or economic zone):  
1. Has the financial infrastructure been consolidated in 
terms of institutional framework, financial intermediation 
and payment system, and confidence in the national 
currency?  
2. Has the financial information system been established in 
terms of economic indicators, supportive financial 
indicators, and latitude in monetary policies? 
3. Has the viability of financial activities been secured in 
terms of financial business scope, cross-border transactions, 
and financial products and services and their innovation. 
  Naturally a good financial infrastructure is needed for a 
good financial information system, which, in turn, is 
needed for a good financial market where good-quality 
financial products and services are provided, renovated and 
promoted.    
  No major financial system has satisfied these 
requirements fully. Even when focusing only on major 
financial markets, we see that the New York and London 
financial markets have failed to continuously provide the 
most relevant economic information, resulting occasionally 
in irrational disruptions such as credit crunch and 
overshooting or even misconduct. Taken as a whole, 
however, these major markets have managed to compete 
and complement each other based on the market 
mechanism and substantial amounts of financial 
information. 
 
  Then, how can the financial system in the Central Asian 
region be assessed from the same viewpoint? It can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. In many countries, the financial infrastructure is fragile. 
Although institutional framework was early arranged with 
the help of international organizations, and related financial 
laws have been enforced for years, confidence in bank 
deposit services has not been established yet and banks 
have not been well trained in loan-production, management 
and collection practice. Bank asset management tends to be 
made in the form of investing surplus funds in short-term 
government securities rather than making loans.  
  Thus, financial intermediation has not been established; 
rather, the term “financial dis-intermediation” represents 
the present situation. The payment system has been far 
from normal. Meanwhile, trust in the national currency has 
been so poor that hard currencies, in particular the dollar, 
have been hiding behind a variety of monetary functions, 
forming a situation of “composite currency” or “dual 
currency”.  
2. Information systems are incomplete and biased. In 
addition to having vast areas that are regulated, almost 
every country’s informal economy has been so prevalent 
that financial indicators tend to distort relevant 
understanding of the whole economic picture. Further, 
barter trade and insufficient statistics always make it 
difficult to capture accurate changes in price level and to 
realize real costs in financial transactions. Quasi-fiscal 
operations also distort the real financial situation because 
use of the banking system often turns out to be a form of 
fiscal obligation in disguise.  
  Moreover, multiple exchange rates in some countries do 
not serve as financial indicators but as disturbers. The 
national currency is functioning as a means of payment 
only and is not being used as a means of savings; and the 
informal market exchange rates, sensitively reflecting the 
hidden demand/supply position of the hard currencies, are 
showing people’s strong preference for hard currency. 
When an increase in money supply leads directly to a 
depreciation of the currency in these circumstances, there 
are many difficulties in using interest rates as indicators. 
3. The financial sector has contributed only partially to the 
economic activities in general. This is represented by the 
small size of the coverage by the banking sector vis-à-vis 
the whole economy. In the meantime, although signs of 
various financial services like insurance, credit cards, 
leasing, etc., have emerged in many countries, they are 
basically rudimentary. Securities trading is partially active 
in government securities markets but is concentrated only 
in short-term purposes, and even though bourse houses 
have been established, they have had a limited role as 
secondary markets for stocks sold in connection with 
privatization of state-owned enterprises. And corporate 
bond issues have been rare.  
  On the whole, there seems to be limited prospect for 
sound development in these economies in view of the fact 
that the basic financial intermediation services remain 
confined. Most modern technological innovations in 
financial services have difficulties in finding their way into 
these under-developed financial markets. As for cross-
border transactions, five Central Asian and Caucasian 
countries remain uncommitted to IMF Article Ⅷ status and 
a couple have kept multiple exchange rates. 
3. Financial Infrastructure  
3.1 Currency Changeover 
The introduction of the “somni” in Tajikistan late last 
October momentarily reminded us of the bitter financial 
experiences in Central Asia in the earlier half of the 1990s. 
Tajikistan changed the denomination of its currency from 
Tajik roubles (2000 per US dollar) to somni (2 per US 
dollar) on October 26, 2000. The somni, however, devalued 
sharply due to the fact that the Tajik people rushed for US 
dollars and substitutable commodities. Fortunately, later 
the somni was reported to have recovered somewhat, from 
2.7 to 2.3 somni per US dollar.  
The changeover from one national currency to another 
tends to produce financial turbulence when the national 
currency has not acquired the public’s confidence 
sufficiently. Many Central Asian countries’ changeovers 
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around 1993 from the Russian rouble to coupon currency 
and further to their own national currencies were 
accompanied by hyperinflation due to excessively 
redundant money supply and such financial disruptions as 
suspension of external payments and bank deposit blockage 
arising from fundamental procedural disorder. These 
developments further weakened the general public’s 
confidence in their national currencies.  
Poor confidence in national currencies, together with 
experiences of malfunction in the banking system, has 
irreparably discouraged bank deposits by individuals. This 
has obliged the banking sector to resort to central-bank or 
inter-bank borrowings and corporate savings forced under 
the existing non-cash transaction system that requires the 
corporate sector to use the banking system only.  
Meanwhile, since the independence, Central Asian 
countries have implemented a series of financial reform 
steps, including legal arrangements for financial systems 
like the introduction of two-tier banking systems, 
bankruptcy laws, and securities markets. Prudential 
guidelines for banking business were adopted at an early 
stage, followed by bank loan restructuring and 
recapitalization into financial institutions. Now, even 
deposit insurance and rating services have been considered 
and partially initiated in a couple of countries. 
However, banking skills in loan production for the 
corporate sector have been so scarcely cultivated that the 
financial channel has been severely restricted for industrial 
and commercial activities except for the so-called directed 
loans, which are often made under pressure from 
jurisdictional authorities. What is worse, the corporate 
sector itself has mostly failed to be viable in the present 
business conditions that require entrepreneurship, capacity 
for market research and financial understanding. 
Thus, financial intermediation practically does not exist 
between the fund surplus and deficit units. Domestic 
savings have scarcely been mobilized for channels to 
productive purposes; most of them remain dormant. 
Meanwhile, the payment system has lacked a good network, 
with poor facilities for clearing purposes among financial 
institutions, resulting in poor settlement performance. 
Transfer or payment fees, in particular for external 
transactions, are unusually expensive. The situation of the 
payment system has been far from desirable by 
international standards. 
3.2 National Currency and Composite Currency 
The currency changeovers in Central Asia have also 
resulted in a freakish style of basic monetary functions. The 
role of standard of value has been latently replaced by the 
US dollar. In addition, the means of storing value has been 
overwhelmingly performed by dollar banki or banker 
savings (in-socks or mattress savings), while national 
currencies have receded virtually to the role of being the 
payment means for everyday life. Such distrust in the 
national currencies has been deeply rooted in many parts of 
Central Asia and perhaps in Caucasia. It should be noted 
that this monetary situation, that is, a “composite currency” 
or “dual currency” system, currently characterizes the 
financial infrastructure in these regions, whether the 
country in question is committed to free currency 
convertibility or not. 
Of course, newly independent countries are apt to take 
pride in their currencies, viewing them as symbols of 
independence and sovereignty. Accordingly, the legal 
tender in Central Asia is in the form of national currency, 
which distinguishes these countries from dollarized or 
quasi-dollarized economies. Still, in practice, the legal 
tender system has been frustrated for years by hard 
currencies, in particular the US dollar. 
The IMF’s 2000 annual report shows that Russia and 
Kazakhstan pursue  “independently floating policy”, while 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan pursue  “managed 
floating policy” with no preannounced path for exchange 
rate. On the other hand, Turkmenistan pursues 
conventional fixed peg arrangements, while Azerbaijan 
pursues the exchange rate policy within crawling bands. 
Despite the difference in classification, the US dollar 
appears to be an anchor currency in most cases.    
On a second glance, however, the real currency situation 
appears a little more delicate than has been anticipated. 
While the US dollar has been dominant in Central Asia for 
years, some analysts argue that the significance of the 
German mark, which is to be replaced by the euro, has not 
been negligible. The Russian rouble is also rumored to 
have assumed a partial monetary role in many parts of 
Central Asia. In Tajikistan the Russian rouble has 
functioned practically as quasi-legal tender, with the US 
dollar being used in big city areas and the Uzbek sum in 
local areas nearby the border.  
The gap between the official stance that assumes the 
predominance of national currency and the real situation of 
composite currency remains wide. It is a major reason why 
the financial infrastructure has not been well consolidated. 
In order to remedy this situation and establish the general 
public’s confidence in national currencies, a variety of 
measures have been tried.  
In Kazakhstan the more than 50 percent devaluation of the 
tenge during 1999 was accompanied by a partial deposit 
conversion that guaranteed the value of deposits, calculated 
at before-devaluation exchange rates (essentially equivalent 
to dollar-denominated deposits), and by the introduction of 
deposit insurance. In Uzbekistan a relief step focusing on 
individual savings was introduced to reduce bank 
obligations for increased reserve deposits with the central 
bank and now the introduction of insurance deposit is being 
considered.  
These measures are expected to enhance the attractiveness 
of national currencies and bolster confidence in the banking 
system. At the same time, however, it should be borne in 
mind that financial confidence is intrinsically fragile under 
composite currency situations in unstable economies and 
that an unstable economy with fragile financial confidence 
is most likely to entail a composite currency situation.  
If you would like to itemize some parts of your 
manuscript, please make use of the specified style 
“itemize” from the drop-down menu of style categories. 
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4. Financial Information 
4.1 Financial Indicators 
It is true that, owing to the intensified efforts by 
international financial institutions like the IMF, more 
information has become available for economic and 
financial analysis of economies in transition. The voluntary 
release of Article Ⅳ staff reports has begun since April 
1999 and efforts have focused on improving data 
dissemination like the Special Data Dissemination Standard 
(SDDS) and the General Data Dissemination System 
(GDDS). The EBRD, BIS and others also provide useful 
information for international comparison purposes. These 
efforts and improvements are sure to provide us with better 
economic data and information, and enhanced arguments 
about Central Asian countries should follow, provided that 
the real economic situation changes very slowly. 
The nature of financial indicators, however, has to be 
carefully examined. For instance, interest rates in many 
economies in transition have a different nature from those 
of major advanced economies. Interest rates in transitional 
economies do not always represent the situation of 
financial intermediation between the fund surplus unit 
(household sector) and the fund deficit unit (corporate 
sector); rather, they reflect inter-bank transactions for 
government securities in the absence of appropriate 
financial intermediation by the banking sector. Outside the 
banking sector, each national currency circulates very 
quickly within its financial territory, performing its 
payment function only.  
The informal, or shadow, economy that is so common and 
prevalent in member countries of the former Soviet Union, 
however, has discredited the quality of their data and 
information. Traditions of barter and the offsetting of debts 
among enterprises have exacerbated the situation. The size 
of the informal economy is often estimated to reach almost 
one-third of the whole economy. Some of the informal 
economy is most likely to be deeply involved in illegal 
transactions but the portion that comes from unmonetized 
transactions is probably not small.  
 Not all of the unofficial activity is avoidable, because 
strong regulations or supply shortages make it difficult to 
dispense with informal transactions. For instance, the 
rigorous application of an excessively appreciated 
exchange rate on the procurement of agricultural products 
near the national boundary easily invites unregistered 
export; the arrears of wages and payments inevitably 
necessitate barter trade/payment offsetting; and the 
shortage and ensuing rationing of foreign exchange 
inevitably fuels informal activities.  
In the current circumstances, the monetized and recorded 
transactions do not represent the whole picture of the 
economy; some economists even argue that the monetized 
transactions have accounted for only 20-30 percent of the 
total corporate transactions in Russia in recent years. The 
situation in Central Asia may not be so far away from that 
in Russia.  
The real financial situation is also distorted because the 
banking system has often been misused to disguise fiscal 
obligations (quasi-fiscal operations or monetization of 
fiscal deficits). In Kazakhstan prior to 1995, government 
debt-guarantees and bank loans were often used to clear 
public sector arrears, resulting in a disguised fiscal deficit; 
the Uzbek government in 1996 directed or authorized bank 
lending to finance cotton producers who suffered bad crops 
and their repayments have been repeatedly rescheduled; in 
Turkmenistan, interest-free directed credits are often 
extended to sectors designated as important and it is often 
reported that the recipients do not make full repayments.  
  Quasi-fiscal operations not only damage the quality of 
fiscal management by incurring the potential for fiscal 
deficits, but also distort the financial situation by creating 
moral hazards in both the creditors’ and the debtors’ minds 
and by abusing the seigniorage of the monetary authorities. 
4.2 Multiple Exchange Rates 
Multiple exchange rate practices were implemented with 
complex foreign exchange controls in Central Asian 
countries before 1995. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
abandoned the practices and accepted Article Ⅷ status in 
the IMF in 1995 and 1996, respectively; Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan also tried unified exchange rates in 1996 and 
1998, respectively, but practically in vain. Uzbekistan 
continues to maintain multiple exchange rates but 
maintains that it is going to try to unify them in the near 
future. Each of the currencies in Central Asian countries 
depreciated sharply soon after the 1998 Russian financial 
crisis. In contrast, Caucasian countries appear to have been 
more successful in establishing single exchange rates and 
managing their exchange rate policies despite the 1998 
Russian crisis. 
Multiple exchange rates in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
have given wrong signals by imposing an implicit export 
tax on exports, while subsidizing imports. This practice, 
together with the required surrender of foreign exchange, 
has encouraged the formation of unofficial channels of 
foreign exchange transactions because of the serious 
shortage of foreign exchange in the official market. These 
practices have also promoted administrative corruption and 
channeled various economic activities to the informal 
economy, adding to tax collection problems by pushing 
them entirely outside the tax base, distorting resource 
allocation, and thus obscuring the real economic landscape 
significantly. 
From the viewpoint of financial information systems, 
exchange-rate-related data in these countries are not 
reliable as economic/financial indicators for market-
oriented activities; they only cause confusion. As a result, 
national currencies, which circulate hastily as a means of 
payment but fail to serve as means of value storage, are 
losing even the role of value standard. In these 
circumstances, the effectiveness of monetary policy is 
considerably doubtful.  
For instance, an increase in money supply leads directly to 
a depreciation of the currency in question without relevant 
influence on interest rates, which already, in practice, serve 
as indicators only inside the inter-bank community. As for 
prices, once the dollar-based value standard is deeply 
rooted among the public, domestic prices are determined 
automatically in line with the change in foreign exchange 
rates. Also, price controls on necessities tend to be 
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exploited by residents in neighboring countries because 
they are priced lower than international prices by an 
appreciated exchange rate. Another example is that foreign 
financial resources are not effectively channeled to 
productive domestic activities, due to uncertainties about 
exchange rates. 
5. Financial Information Scope of Financial 
Activities and Their Innovations 
5.1 Bank Credit 
The presence of the financial system is relatively small 
among CIS countries. Even so, banks have been in 
operation since before 1990 in some way or other, though 
different in style and practice from the market-oriented 
framework. As of present, regardless of questionable 
efficiency, depth and influence in the whole economy, the 
banking sector has been the dominant player in the role of 
financial institutions.  
Nevertheless, in Part Ⅱ“Financial Sector in Transition” of 
the 1998 Transition Report, the EBRD pointed out a very 
shallow relationship between the real economy and the 
banking sector in transition economies. This is shown by a 
by far lower ratio of “bank credit to the private sector ” to 
GNP per capita than in market-economy countries. This 
relationship could be represented more easily by the ratio 
of money supply (broad money) to GDP, which is regarded 
as a proxy of bank activity, which is related to financial 
services to the real economy. 
Based on the 2000 Transition Report’s financial data, the 
ratio of broad money to GDP in 1999 was around 15 
percent in Central Asia, except for Tajikistan, which 
showed a very low figure of 7 percent. It was 7-13 percent 
in Caucasia, 14-17 percent in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, 
and 43-46 percent in Poland and Hungary. An exception 
was the 75 percent in the Czech Republic, which was along 
the lines of the OECD member countries’ average.  
A number of factors are considered to have contributed to 
this tendency, including slow monetization, barter trade, 
circulation speed of money, the informal economy, the 
degree of financial intermediation, etc. A critical 
implication from this fact would, however, be that bank 
lending provides vital services that smooth, promote and 
enhance economic activities. 
5.2 Capital Market and Non-bank Financial     
    Services 
The 1998 Transition Report also suggested that capital 
markets in transition economies were relatively small by 
international standards and that there existed virtually no 
corporate bond market. Even where any bond market 
existed, short-term bonds were highly predominant over 
long-term bonds. Securities trading is partially active in 
government securities markets but is concentrated only for 
short-term purposes; even though bourse houses have been 
established they have had a limited role as secondary 
markets for stocks sold in connection with privatization of 
state-owned enterprises. And corporate bond issues have 
been rare. 
This might be a foregone conclusion, because in almost 
every economy, the banking system plays the major role in 
the early stages of economic development. Capital markets, 
which are late to develop, historically require sophisticated 
legal and institutional prerequisites and such supportive 
financial facilities as accounting, researcher and analyst 
services, financial network, etc. Retarded privatization of 
state-owned enterprises has also been responsible for the 
under-developed capital markets in the CIS member 
countries. 
Non-bank financial services like insurance, credit cards, 
leasing, pensions and investment funds are generally 
rudimentary. Though discussed among experts, little 
progress has been made in the practical deployment of such 
modern facilities as ATM or electronic banking services. 
As will be discussed further, consolidating the financial 
system of banking- and securities-based intermediation is 
likely to expand the latitude for these auxiliary and 
peripheral financial activities. So far, the benefits from 
advanced financial technology remain obviously thin.  
As discussed earlier, payment services remain backward: 
little information is available on costs and benefits of such 
banking services as fund transfers, credit transfers or direct 
debiting for individuals, bill/check exchange, clearing 
system or foreign exchange clearing for corporate clients. 
Slow services, even at the time of deposit withdrawal, are 
often cited. In these circumstances, it is difficult to say that 
timely reliable transfer and settlement services are well 
established. Unusually high fees are reported to be 
applicable for cross-border credit transfers, reflecting the 
difficulty in securing safe and timely transactions.  
As for cross-border transactions, their performance has 
generally been poor, reflecting unattractive economic 
conditions, limited services in trade, and meandering 
foreign direct investment. Four countries in Central Asia 
and Caucasia remain uncommitted to IMF ArticleⅧ status 
(Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan). 
Whether the real economy can reap the benefits of its 
potential economic capacity depends largely on the 
availability of the above-mentioned diversified and 
elaborate financial services and facilities. Even the 
corporate sector has difficulties in obtaining the benefits of 
modern banking services, including financial products, 
network services and information services. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Under the centrally controlled regime, the financial sector 
was “little more than a bookkeeping mechanism for 
tabulating the authorities’ decisions about the resources to 
be allocated to different enterprises and sectors. Securities 
markets were absent, since the authorities created no 
marketable financial instruments” (1998 Transition Report, 
Chap. 5). Because the mono-bank-based financial system 
had not anticipated financial intermediation, banks in 
command economies had developed little capacity to 
provide, manage and collect loans. No need had been 
emphasized for prudential regulation. 
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Macro-economic stability and predictability should be 
strengthened before or along with the consolidation of 
financial infrastructure. Of course, social infrastructure and 
moral discipline are deeply associated with this process. 
Unfortunately, however, some analysts have pointed out 
that, in some transition economies the state is “no longer 
capable of purposive autonomous action but prey instead to 
self-seeking private interests.” (Financial Times dated Oct. 
11, 2000; Martin Wolf “Avoiding the trap of transition”)   
As discussed, confidence in the financial system has not 
been well established in the formerly centrally controlled 
economies in Central Asia. Accordingly, financial 
intermediation is severely underdeveloped even in the 
banking sector, and capital markets for securities (stock 
and bond) issue and transactions are even more 
underdeveloped.  
As the 1998 Transition Report suggested, however, 
intensified efforts to consolidate simultaneously both 
banking and securities activities into one financial system 
will be beneficial in view of the increased importance of 
the open market economy, corporate governance and 
diverse assessments of economic performance. Support in 
the form of modern information and communication 
technology is likely to overcome information and economic 
barriers that have characterized Central Asian economies 
for many years.  
That Central Asia as a whole has been financially 
underdeveloped is very apparent, but definite differences 
among the five Central Asian countries are more difficult 
to perceive. Even so, Kazakhstan seems more prepared to 
go ahead in developing new financial policies to 
consolidate its financial system; for instance, banking 
restructuring and international bond and municipal or 
corporate bond issuance were first taken up by Kazakhstan.  
Not a few economists are of the view that differences in 
transition path are becoming clearer with Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan moving faster toward a market-economy 
framework, Uzbekistan sustaining tight trade and exchange 
controls, and Turkmenistan and Tajikistan being 
surrounded with uncertainties.  
Still, while Kyrgyzstan is heavily indebted externally, 
Kazakhstan is taking a zig-zag course, as is shown by the 
change in number of banks; Kazakhstan started with 72 
banks in 1991, peaked at 204 in 1993, and followed with a 
sharp decline to 55 in 1999. Its bond issues attracted much 
attention in the international financial community, but there 
has also been much attention on the reliability of local 
municipal and corporate bond issues. The international 
community is increasingly cautious against default on 
bonds offered by some issuers of transitional economies, 
including China.   
Ten years have passed since the financial situation in 
Central Asia changed completely around in 1990, and the 
financial sector there has been trying to cast off the old skin 
and outgrow the old rules and business practices toward 
internationally accepted models. But this will not be a one-
change-fixes-all answer to these countries’ financial sector 
problems, because even in advanced countries the financial 
environment is changing rapidly with accelerated 
technological innovation centering on information and 
communication.  
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Structure of the financial sector
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--- trust in the national currency
banking activity insurance
credit cards, etc. derivativesasset management, trust
 
 Fig. 6 Financial Infrastructure, Information, and Activities 
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Composite Currency Practices
Domestic 
Currency
Hard
Currency
Means of exchange
(payments)
Unit of account
(calculations)
Wealth storage
(savings)
 
Effectiveness of monetary policy ?
Corruption!
Money supply ⇒ currency depreciation only?
Policy formation ?Reducing tax revenue ?
Informal economy!
Devalation ⇒ limited? (because of the 
informal market where the devaluation has 
already been preemptied) 
Interest rates ⇒ interbank transactions only?
 Fig. 7 Composite Currency Practice 
 
 
Financial sector
Kazakh-
stan
Kyrgyz-
stan
Tajiki-
stan
Turkmeni-
stan
Uzbeki-
Stan
Azer-
baijan
Russia
Number of banks
(of which foreign
wned )
55(18) 23(5) 20(3) 13(4) 35(5) 79(3) 2376(33)
Bad loans ( in %
of total loans ) 5.8 6.4 15.8 0.5 0.1 19.6 13.1
Capital adequacy
ratio 8% 12% 12% 10% 8% 8% 8%
Deposit
insurance system yes no no no no(yes) no no
Secured
transaction  law yes yes yes restricted Yes restricted yes
Securities
commission yes yes yes no Yes yes yes
 
 Table 1: Financial Sector 
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Exchange rate (per US dollar, end year)
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Kazakhstan(Tenge) 0.8 6.3 54.3 64.0 73.8 75.9 84.0 138.0 143.0
Kyrgyzstan(Soms) 511.0 8.0 10.7 11.2 16.7 17.4 29.4 45.5 48.0
Tajikistan(T. roubles) 5.1 12 36 285 328 748 977 1,436 2,000
Turkmenistan(Manats) na 30 75 2,442 5,126 5,222 8,148 9,200
Uzbekiatan(Sums) 415.0 1 28.0 39.3 67.2 108.5 176.8 347.0
Azerbaijan(Manats) 45.0 256 4,330 4,440 4,098 3,888 3,890 4,378
Russia(Roubles) 0.5 1.2 3.6 4.6 5.6 6.0 20.7 26.8 28.0
Data:EBRD’s Transition Report 2000
Tajikistan: until 1994, 100Russian roubles per US dollar, afterwards Tajikistan roubles.
Turkmenistan has had dual exchange rates for most months after the introduction of the 
manat in November 1993. The series refers to a
ven as the buying rate offered at 
commercial banks until September 1998 and the black market rate thereafter.
Uzbekistan: roubles per US dollar until 1993. Since 1996, dual exchange rates have been in 
operation. Data show
n 1999, the parallel market premium rose to 500% 
over the official rate by year-end.
 
 weighted average between the official exchange 
rate (60% weight) and the commercial rate (40%), gi
 the weighted average of the official exchange rate (40%), the bank rate 
(30%) and the parallel market rate (30%). I
 Table2: Exchange Rate 
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